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Adolf Grünbaum maintains that, within the framework of special relativity, the relation of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer is conventional rather than factual in character. His argument turns on two assertions:
(1) The relation is not uniquely definable in terms of the relation of causal connectibility.
(2) Temporal relations are non-conventional if and only if they are so definable.
The second assertion constitutes a version of the "causal theory of time."
And in a 1989 letter to Max Jammer, Malament explained that when he wrote that article, he directed it exclusively against my own specific version of conventionalism. , for example, sees no reason why we must adopt a causal theory of time or, for that matter, any other reductionist analysis of temporal relations. Even if (1) is true, he argues, it does not follow that there is no fact to the matter whether two events are simultaneous relative to a particular inertial observer.
I am entirely sympathetic with Friedman's scepticism concerning (2). But Malament's own argument against (1), as he construes it, proceeds without reference to the merits or demerits of the causal theory of time, since his concern is to refute (1) within the framework of a causal theory of temporal order "even while avoiding debate over conventionalism and causal theories of time" (Ibid.) . Therefore, to achieve expository clarity, I
shall defer to Section 6 my retort to Friedman's objection to the causal ontology of temporal relations in the special theory of relativity.
Malament's argument is that he has demonstrated the unique definability denied by assertion (1), so that the "if" clause in assertion (2) then entails the non-conventionality (facticity) of the specified simultaneity relation, a conclusion he calls "rather ironic" (Malament 1977, p. 293). Alas, he does not give references to my writings to document his claim that I committed myself to (1) and (2) in his particular sense of definability, which is predicated on specified constraints. Indeed, I had not: As Allen Janis has importantly pointed out, one of these constraints--the first of four--is genuinely problematic, and I had certainly not taken it for granted, implicitly or otherwise, in my writings on the status of simultaneity in the inertial frames of the special theory of relativity ("STR").
In the causal context of the light cone structure of the STR, the facticity versus conventionality of the relation of simultaneity relative to an inertial frame I turns on whether the facts of causal connectibility and non-connectibility mandate (dictate) that relativized relation, on the one hand, or whether these facts provide scope for alternative non-trivial stipulations in constructing that relation, on the other. The issue raised by Malament's particular sense of definability is thus whether the first of the constraints he imposes on the causal definability of relative simultaneity is mandated by the pertinent causal facts or is non-trivially stronger than what is thus mandated; furthermore, if that constraint is stronger, we shall need to determine the bearing of dropping it on the unique definability of relative simultaneity in terms of the relation of causal connectibility.
2. Malament considers an inertial observer O, i.e., an observer at rest with respect to an inertial frame I. To facilitate the statement of the four constraints he imposes on any causally definable candidate for the relation of simultaneity with respect to O, he employs the following definitions (1977, p. 297): (a) A "causal automorphism" is a one-to-one mapping of the spacetime onto itself which preserves the relation κ of causal connectibility among its event elements, and (b) an "O causal automorphism" is a causal automorphism that maps the world line of O onto itself. The four constraints he then imposes on any candidate S( p, q) for the relation of simultaneity between two events p and q relative to O are the following:
(ii) S is an equivalence relation, (iii) There exist world points p and q, one of which is on O's world line while the other is not, such that S( p, q), (iv) S is not the universal relation.
Having imposed all four of these constraints, notably the first, Malament is able to prove that the relative simultaneity relation of standard synchrony ∈=½ is uniquely definable from κ and O. He denotes the latter relation by Sim 0 .
But before giving this proof, he declared: "To be sure, there are other two-place relations [of relative simultaneity] which are definable from κ and O [i.e., relative simultaneity relations corresponding to non-standard synchrony, for example, some fixed ∈≠½]. But all these are ruled out if minimal, seemingly innocuous conditions are imposed." One can agree at once that constraints (iii) and (iv) are minimal and innocuous. But, as we shall see, what matters in the context of the issue of the conventionality versus the facticity of relative simultaneity as formulated above, is that the first of Malament's constraints is demonstrably not "innocuous,"
because it is not mandated by the facts of causal connectibility or non-connectibility.
Since his constraint (i) may therefore be dropped and be replaced by a different one or another, I never took it for granted. And since Malament's sense of "definability" presupposes (i), I did not, and do not now assert either assertions (1) or (2) in his sense of "definability." Therefore, his demonstration that assertion (1) is false as he construes "definability" does not tell against my views. By the same token, in assertion (2), I do not subscribe to the "if" clause in his sense of "definability" as a sufficient condition for the non-conventionality of temporal relations.
And yet Malament relies on just that "if" clause to deduce the non-conventionality of relative simultaneity from the negation of (1). Precisely because his constraint (i) is not mandated by the causal facts, and is thus replaceable, it will turn out that these facts allow a whole family of relative simultaneity relations that are definable from κ and O, so that assertion (1) becomes true rather than false as Malament would have it.
I shall use Allen Janis's scrutiny of Malament's constraint (i) to explain why I believe that Malament has failed to discredit my ontological version of the claim that the conventionality of relative simultaneity in the STR is a philosophically illuminating thesis. But it is expeditious and simpler to deal first with (ii), which asserts that "S is an equivalence relation."
Let the clock of the inertial observer O assign a unique time coordinate t to every event on O's world line. And let O also assign time coordinates to each event not on O's world line.
These assignments are to be governed by the following restriction: If a pair of distinct (i.e., noncoinciding) events is causally connectible (by means of light in vacuo or by other causal chains), they will be "time-separated" by being assigned different time coordinates; thus, the same time coordinate will be assigned to distinct events only if they are not causally connectible, i.e., only if they have a space-like separation, i.e., (in Hans Reichenbach's parlance) only if they are "topologically simultaneous."
As we know, the invariant relation of "topological simultaneity" (causal nonconnectibility) is not transitive and hence is not an equivalence relation: If an event E 1 on O's world line is topologically simultaneous with an event E′ not on that world line, and if E′, in turn, is topologically simultaneous with an event E on O's world line but distinct from E 1 , then E 1 and E will not be topically simultaneous, since they both belong to O's world line, and are thus causally connectible.
By the same token, the topological simultaneity of two distinct events is not sufficient for their being assigned the same time coordinate t: If the topologically simultaneous pairs (E 1 , E′) and (E′, E) were each assigned the same value of t, then O's clock would be assigning the same time coordinate to both E 1 and E on its own world line in violation of our restriction that causally connectible events be time-separated.
But we shall say that two topologically simultaneous events are "metrically simultaneous" with respect to O, if and only if O's clock does assign the same time coordinate to them. And since the relation of numerical equality among time coordinates is an equivalence relation, any relation of metrical simultaneity, as defined, will be an equivalence relation. Thus, for any one value of Reichenbach's ∈(O<∈<1) that O uses to assign time coordinates to events elsewhere from his clock--be it the value ∈=½ of standard synchrony or a value ∈≠½ in that open interval corresponding to non-standard synchrony--the ensuing metrical simultaneity will be an equivalence relation.
It is very important not to confuse the preceding assignment of time coordinates from one and the same clock O to events not on O's world line, with the time coordinatization in the following different situation: Two separate observers A and B at rest in the same inertial frame each assign time coordinates to events on the other's world line using the same non-standard synchrony ∈ m ≠½. In that case, once the B-clock is in such non-standard ∈ m synchrony with the A-clock, the A-clock will not be in ∈ m synchrony with the B-clock, i.e., the same non-standard synchrony is not symmetric as between separated clocks and hence is not an equivalence relation. 4 In other words, the B-clock's time coordinatization of events at the A-clock will disagree with the A-clock's own time coordinatization of these events. Thus, in the case of nonstandard clock synchrony, if two spatially separated events are assigned the same time coordinates by the A-clock--i.e., are metrically simultaneous from A's point of view--they will not be metrically simultaneous from B's point of view.
Indeed, I have shown that if the same non-standard synchrony ∈ m is used to synchronize a clock B from a clock A, and a clock C from B, then the C-clock will not be in ∈ m synchrony with A. 5 Thus, non-standard synchrony is intransitive rather than merely non-transitive. Hence such synchrony fails in a further respect to be an equivalence relation. So much for Malament's constraint (ii), demanding that S be an equivalence relation.
Before turning to Janis's scrutiny of constraint (i), several considerations are in order to set the stage for it.
3. To articulate the sense in which I shall claim that, in the STR, the relevant physical facts do not mandate a unique relation of relative simultaneity, let me explain carefully in just what sense the pertinent physical facts postulated in Newtonian physics do mandate a unique and indeed absolute relation of simultaneity between pairs of events. And I shall do so without appeal to Newton's substantivalist ontology of time (or space). 6 Let the solid line on the left in the diagram above be a portion of the world-line of a clock U 1 which is at rest at a point A of an inertial system I. And let E′ be an event belonging to the career of another clock U 2 at rest at a point B of I. Furthermore, suppose that any clock U which moves in I and intersects the world-line of U 1 has the same reading as the latter for the event of their first encounter. It is then a fact that (after allowance for the effects of what Reichenbach has called "differential forces") U will have the same reading as U 1 for any subsequent encounter with it. This agreement between U and U 1 is not, however, the sole respect in which Newtonian and relativistic clock transport differ from one another.
In the Newtonian world of arbitrarily fast particles (or causal chains), the career S of U 1 contains a unique event E which cannot also belong to the career of any moving clock U (or other particle) containing with E′. Once the Newtonian time system is elaborated, this fact can be expressed by the statement that "the same body (U) cannot be at two different places (A and B) at the same time." And the specified unique event E divides S into disjoint open subintervals of events X and Y having the following properties: every event x in X and every event y in Y can also belong to the world-line of a moving clock U whose intersection with the world-line of U 2 is E′. But it is also true (by our definition of X and Y) that E is the only event in S which is temporally between every x in X and every y in Y. It follows that (i) E′ and E are temporally between identically the same events in S, and (ii) in any system of quasi-serial temporal order comprising the events on U 2 and in S, E′ and E occupy the same place with respect to the order of earlier and later as a matter of ordinal temporal fact. Hence on the basis of temporal betweenness relations alone, E′ is uniquely simultaneous with E within S, and E is uniquely simultaneous with E′ within the career of U 2 .
In order to characterize further the ontological status of the simultaneity furnished by Newtonian clock transport, it behooves us to comment on the bearing of causal relations in Newton's theory on its time relations. Newton's third law of motion (law of action and equal, opposite reaction), coupled with his law of universal gravitation, tells us that our E and E′ are linkable by reciprocal instantaneous gravitational influences. These can be represented as causal
non-simultaneous events can be linked by a non-gravitational causal chain which is genidentical, i.e., which is constituted by the career of one and the same body. The career of a single standard clock is, of course, an instance of merely one particular species of genidentical causal chain.
It would clearly be inconsistent with Newton's temporal order to demand, as is done in the STR, the non-simultaneity of two events connectible only by the fastest causal chain rather than by a single clock. For on Newton's theory, our events E and E′ are simultaneous according to its clock readings, and yet they are connectible by Newton's fastest causal chain (gravitation) and only by such a chain. By contrast, the STR requires its clocks to be set so as to issue in the non-simultaneity of any two events which can belong only to the career of its fastest causal chains (light), even though these events cannot both be on the world-line of a single clock.
It is clear from our analysis that in Newton's world events are simultaneous as a matter of physical fact because of nonmetrical temporal relations furnished by that world's clocks and/or causal relations. Spatially separated Newtonian clocks at A and B can be consistently synchronized by transporting a third clock U from A to B and making each of them locally synchronous with U when it coincides with them. We see that the sameness of the time numbers furnished for simultaneous events by such synchronized clocks A and B renders an equivalence relation that exists between these events as a matter of physical fact. Thus the existence of the relation to which the Newtonian theory applies the name "simultaneous" does not involve any conventional ingredient. What is conventional here is the particular identity of the time number assigned alike to all members of a class of simultaneous events. The identity of that number results from one arbitrary setting of one clock. But the equivalence relation of simultaneity rendered by the same clock numbers is not predicated on a convention in Newton's theory.
Newtonian simultaneity is absolute in the standard physical sense that the simultaneity of two events E and E′ is invariant with respect to all reference frames. But Newton's simultaneity is also factual, as opposed to conventional, because it is vouchsafed by purely ordinal temporal facts furnished by the clocks and/or causal relations in his world.
This then is the sense in which, I claim, the pertinent physical facts in Newton's world mandate a unique and indeed absolute relation of simultaneity. It will behoove us to bear this state of affairs in mind, by way of contrast to the STR, when we inquire to what extent the relevant physical facts mandate a relation of relative simultaneity in the STR. 4 . Howard Stein made a helpful distinction that I shall bring to bear on my appraisal below of Friedman's critique of me, which Malament endorsed: 7 There are really two distinct aspects to the issue of the "conventionality" of Einstein's concept of relative simultaneity. One may assume the position of Einstein himself at the outset of his investigation--that is, of one confronted by a problem, trying to find a theory that will deal with it satisfactorily; or one may assume the position of (for instance) Minkowski--that is, of one confronted with a theory already developed, trying to find its most adequate and instructive formulation. The issue in its latter aspect has been dealt with--in my opinion, conclusively--by David Malament (1977), . . .
As to the procedure of Einstein, he of course had no "space-time geometry" within which to propose a concept of simultaneity; on the contrary, the task he had conceived was precisely that of constructing a suitable space-time geometry--or equivalently, in Einstein's own terms, of devising a suitable new kinematics.
As to Einstein's account of the ontological status of simultaneity relative to an inertial frame, we need to turn first to Section 1, entitled "Definition of Simultaneity," in his 1905 paper. 8 There he uses the German word "Festsetzung," which I translate by "stipulation," when he tells us of the need for a "Festsetzung" to make temporal comparisons at spatially separated points. This "Festsetzung" comes into play, he says, when we endeavor to define a "time" that is "common" to space points A and B. The latter time, he explains, can now be "defined," "indem man durch Definition festsetzt," i.e., "by stipulating by means of a definition," that the one-way transit times of a reflected light ray in opposite directions of the path AB are equal. 9 This is his optical specification of the familiar standard synchrony of clocks. Thus, events at A and B that are assigned equal time coordinates by this stipulation are metrically simultaneous on the strength of it.
In 1954 (originally 1916), Einstein made it even more explicit that he contrasts a "stipulation" with a "supposition" or a "hypothesis" such that there is no fact to the matter whether two events are simultaneous relative to a particular inertial observer. (ii) The recognition that, in the STR, the whole system of invariant temporal relations is ontologically coextensive with the specified causal relations provides a clear framework for Grünbaum's argument, unlike Reichenbach's, has the advantage that if it were correct, we could draw semantic conclusions about the truth-value of sentences containing "simultaneous" on the basis of the referential properties of their key terms. For, if Grünbaum's argument is correct, it follows that "simultaneous" has no referent--there is no objective physical relation for it to refer to. And this would make the conventionalist contention that sentences like "Events e 1 and e 2 are simultaneous with respect to state of inertial motion M " lack determinate truth-value highly plausible. However, it seems to me that Grünbaum's actual argument is much less persuasive than Reichenbach's.
Reichenbach has given some plausibility to the claim that statements about distant simultaneity may be unverifiable within the context of special relativity. As far as I can see, Grünbaum has given us no reason to accept the view that the only objective temporal relations are constituted by causal relations. Indeed, how could one possibly support such a view? Our only grip on which properties and relations are objective constituents of the physical world is via our best theories of the physical world. The properties and relations that we hold to exist objectively are those that our best physical theories postulate. And since our best theories do not merely postulate the kind of ordinal (causal) temporal relations favored by Grünbaum--they postulate metrical relations as well--we have no reason to grant such ordinal (causal) relations the privileged ontological status that Grünbaum wants to ascribe to them.
But, as we saw, Einstein stated emphatically that assertions of metrical simultaneity in the STR are not "hypotheses" which are "postulated" in Friedman's sense, ontologically on a par with, say, the postulate that light is the fastest causal chain. Why then does Friedman feel entitled to gloss over that important ontological difference by using the same term "postulate" for both? By the same token, he does not tell us what he makes of the following 1949 ontological declaration of Einstein's: 15 We now shall inquire into the insights of definite nature which physics owes to the special theory of relativity.
(1) There is no such thing as simultaneity of distant events; 
